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Abstract
From conspiracy theories to fake cures and
fake treatments, COVID-19 has become a hot-
bed for the spread of misinformation online. It
is more important than ever to identify meth-
ods to debunk and correct false information
online. In this paper, we present a methodol-
ogy and analyses to characterize the two com-
peting COVID-19 misinformation communi-
ties online: (i) misinformed users or users
who are actively posting misinformation, and
(ii) informed users or users who are actively
spreading true information, or calling out mis-
information. The goals of this study are two-
fold: (i) collecting a diverse set of annotated
COVID-19 Twitter dataset that can be used
by the research community to conduct mean-
ingful analysis; and (ii) characterizing the two
target communities in terms of their network
structure, linguistic patterns, and their mem-
bership in other communities. Our analyses
show that COVID-19 misinformed communi-
ties are denser, and more organized than in-
formed communities, with a high volume of
the misinformation being part of disinforma-
tion campaigns. Our analyses also suggest
that a large majority of misinformed users
may be anti-vaxxers. Finally, our sociolinguis-
tic analyses suggest that COVID-19 informed
users tend to use more narratives than misin-
formed users.
1 Introduction
With the emergence of COVID-19 pandemic, the polit-
ical and medical misinformation has elevated to create
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what is being commonly referred to as the global info-
demic. False information has hampered proper com-
munication, and affected the decision-making process
[BE+20]. This makes debunking of false information
vitally important. According to one study [TLC15],
if left undisputed, misinformation can in fact exacer-
bate the spread of the epidemic itself. Process of de-
bunking misinformation, however, is complex and one
that is not completely understood [CJHJA17]. This
is because in order to conduct any intervention, it is
first imperative to be able to identify the misinfor-
mation, as well as the misinformed communities. Be-
cause of the scarcity of data, and diversity of misin-
formation themes, this is already a challenging task
in itself, but is also not enough. A second, and ar-
guably a more important aspect of an intervention is
to be able to correct and change the beliefs of the
misinformed communities. To be able to do this, it
is important to understand how different communi-
ties interact, which communities they belong to, and
what are their preferences. In this paper, we charac-
terize the COVID-19 misinformation communities on
Twitter in terms of their network structure, linguis-
tic patterns, and membership in other misinformation
and disinformation communities. In the process, we
also design and collect a large annotated dataset with
a comprehensive codebook that we make available for
the community to use for further analysis and models
for misinformation detection.
2 Background
2.1 COVID-19 Datasets
In the short amount of time, many COVID-19 datasets
have been released. Most of these datasets are generic,
and lack annotations or labels. Examples include mul-
tilingual corpus on a wide variety of topics related
to COVID-19 [CLF20, AMEP+20, HJB+20], longi-
tudinal Twitter chatter dataset [BTW+20], multilin-
gual dataset with location information of the users
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[QIO20], Twitter dataset for Arabic tweets [AAA20],
Twitter dataset for popular Arabic tweets [HHSE20],
and dataset for identification of stance, replies, and
quotes [VCKBC20]. Most of these datasets either have
no annotations at all, employ automated annotations
using transfer learning or semi-supervised methods, or
are not specifically designed for misinformation.
In terms of datasets collected for COVID-19 mis-
information analysis and detection, examples include
CoAID [CL20] which contains automatic annotations
for tweets, replies, and claims for fake news; ReCOV-
ery [ZMFZ20] is a multimodal dataset annotated for
tweets sharing reliable versus unreliable news, anno-
tated via distant supervision; FakeCovid [SN20] is a
multilingual cross-domain fake news detection dataset
with manual annotations; and [DSW20] is a large-scale
Twitter dataset also focused on fake news. A survey
of the different COVID-19 datasets can be found in
[LUM+20] and [SAAA20].
In terms of the diversity of the classes, and the size
of the dataset, the most relevant dataset is by Alam et
al. [ASN+20] who, like our study, present a compre-
hensive codebook to annotate tweets on a finer granu-
larity. Their dataset, however, is limited to a few hun-
dred tweets, and our dataset is much more diverse in
the range of topics covered. Dharawat et al. [DLMZ20]
present a similar dataset with focus on the severity of
the misinformation. However, their dataset does not
consider the different “types” of misinformation. Fi-
nally, Song et al. present a dataset in [SPJ+20] which
contains a diverse set of 10 categories, but still is not
as large, and contains fewer categories in relation to
the dataset collected within our study.
2.2 Misinformation Analysis
A plethora of research has already been conducted
for analysing COVID-19 misinformation online. Some
examples include categorization and identification
of misinformed users based on their home coun-
tries, social identities, and political affiliation [HC20],
[SSM+20], characterization of different types conspir-
acy theories propagated by Twitter bots [Fer20], char-
acterization of the prevalence of low-credibility infor-
mation related to COVID-19 [YTLM20], exploratory
analysis of the content of COVID-19 tweets [OPR20,
SDM20], understanding the types, sources, and claims
of COVID-19 misinformation [BSHN20], and compar-
ison of the credibility of COVID-19 tweets to datasets
pertaining to other health issues [BKF+20]. To the
best of our knowledge none of the studies have char-
acterized COVID-19 misinformation communities in
terms of their sociolinguistic patterns. In this study,
we do not characterize the misinformation content di-
rectly. Instead, we conduct a set of analysis to un-
derstand and characterize these communities through
their content, and content-sharing behaviors and in-
teractions.
3 Methodology
3.1 Data Collection
To collect Twitter dataset, we use Twitter search API
using a diverse set of keywords as shown in table 1 to
collect data. The collected data ranges from January
9th 2020 to July 8th 2020.
Table 1: This table shows the hashtags, and keywords
we used in conjunction with “coronavirus” and “covid”
to collect data from Twitter
Type Terms
Keywords
bleach, vaccine, acetic acid, steroids, essential
oil, saltwater, ethanol, children, kids, garlic,
alcohol, chlorine, sesame oil, conspiracy, 5G,
cure, colloidal silver, dryer, bioweapon, co-
caine, hydroxychloroquine, chloroquine, gates,
immune, poison, fake, treat, doctor, senna
makki, senna tea
Hashtags
#nCoV20199, #CoronaOutbreak, #Coro-
naVirus, #CoronavirusCoverup, #Coro-
navirusOutbreak, #COVID19, #Coron-
avirus, #WuhanCoronavirus, #coronaviris,
#Wuhan
3.2 Data Annotation
Our annotation task aims to determine the category
to which a given tweet belongs to. After many dis-
cussions and revisions, we identify 17 categories that a
particular tweet could classify to. These 17 categories
are defined in table 2. These categories are defined in
further detail along with their definitions and exam-
ples in our codebook which we make available for the
public to use1.
Based on these categories, tweets were randomly
and uniformly sampled from the data collection to
maintain diversity in terms of topics covered. In the
first phase around 4573 tweets were annotated by a
single annotator. Table 2 shows the distribution of
the data in terms of the different categories as anno-
tated by the first annotator. In the second phase, 651
of these annotated tweets were assigned randomly to
6 other annotators.
4 Data Description
Our data collection strategy is different from others
in two main aspects: (i) we have a diverse set of cate-
gories taking into consideration different types of infor-
mation and misinformation online; and (ii) our dataset
1Our annotation codebook can be found at:
tinyurl.com/cmumiscov19-codebook
Table 2: This table describes the categories we identi-
fied to classify/annotate tweets along with the distri-
bution of annotations as identified by Annotator 1 in
the first phase.
Category Count
Irrelevant 131
Conspiracy 924
True Treatment 0
True Prevention 175
Fake Cure 141
Fake Treatment 34
False Fact or Prevention 321
Correction/Calling out 1331
Sarcasm/Satire 476
True Public Health Response 163
False Public Health Response 3
Politics 512
Ambiguous/Difficult to Classify 143
Commercial Activity or Promotion 37
Emergency Response 17
News 95
Panic Buying 70
is one of the very few, if not the only one, with em-
phasis on informed communities with categories such
as “True Prevention”, “Calling out/correction”, “True
Public Health Response”, and “Sarcasm”. We believe
this is necessary as building models requires not just
the annotation of false information, but as well as com-
plementary true information categories.
At the end, we have 4573 annotated tweets, com-
prising of 3629 users with an average of 1.24 tweets per
user. Our annotated data not only covers a wide range
of categories as observed in table 2, but also covers a
wide range of topics as can be seen in figure 1. We
call this dataset CMU-MisCOV19. It is available to
the public for further research and analysis2.
Figure 1: This chart shows the frequency of each iden-
tified topic across all the tweets. Note: Some tweets
may have more than one topic.
2We will make the data public at the acceptance of our paper.
The data will contain twitter id for each tweet along with their
corresponding annotations, and stance. The tweet id can be
used to rehydrate the tweets.
5 Analysis and Discussion
5.1 Identifying Communities
Conducting analyses for a competing set of communi-
ties requires identifying those communities first. Be-
cause we have already annotated data across a set
of true and false information categories, we identify
the membership of the users by assigning a valence
of +1 to the categories True Treatment, True Pre-
vention, Correction/Calling Out, Sarcasm/Satire, and
True Public Health Response, and a valence of -1 to
the categories Conspiracy, Fake Cure, Fake Treatment,
False Fact or Prevention, and False Public Health Re-
sponse. Note that we assign the valence to the cate-
gories (or annotations) and not the tweets themselves.
This is so that we can leverage the annotations from
multiple annotators. At the end, we compute the va-
lence of each user as a weighted sum of the valence
of the annotations assigned to their tweets. Then we
use the valence assigned to each user to identify their
stance or membership i.e. if valence is greater than
0, the user is assigned to the informed group, and if
the valence is less than 0, the user is assigned to the
misinformed group. Out of 3629 users, the commu-
nity detection process assigns 47% (1697) of the users
to the informed group, 29% (1043) of the users to the
misinformed group, and 24% (889) of the users to am-
biguous or irrelevant category3.
5.2 Data Augmentation
Because our goal is to characterize communities and
their behaviors, once we identify the two communities,
we collect the timelines of users in each community to
augment our data. Our hypothesis is that users are
consistent in their stance across all their posts, and
hence these posts can be used to mitigate survivorship
bias [BGIR92] within our analyses.
5.3 Network Analysis
To conduct network analysis, we first extract only
the COVID-19 related tweets from the timelines of
each user. We do this by filtering all the tweets by
the case-insensitive keywords “corona” and “covid”.
We then extract the retweet, mention, and reply net-
works of the two target communities, and combine
those networks together. We then compute the net-
work density for each of the two groups. As described
in [MTMC20], network density is defined as the ra-
tio of actual connections and potential connections.
3Irrelevant users are users who have only posted tweets
within other categories such as “Politics” or “Emergency”. Be-
cause these categories do not have an assigned valence related
to misinformation, they are not relevant for the purposes of this
study.
In dense networks, conformity of the ideas is highly
encouraged, and difference of opinions is discouraged.
We also use ORA-PRO [CRC, ACR17, ACR18] to plot
the network graph as shown in figure 2
Figure 2: Retweet+Mention+Reply network with in-
formed users (in green) and misinformed users (in
red) created using ORA-PRO [ACR18, Car17]. Note:
Users with unidentified or ambiguous stance have been
removed from the graph for simplicity.
We note that both the informed and misinformed
users display echo-chamberness with misinformed sub-
communities being much denser than the informed
sub-communities as shown in table 3. We do, how-
ever, notice some two-way communication from both
sides.
Table 3: This table shows the number of nodes,
links, and the network density for the two target sub-
communities.
Measure Overall Informed Misinformed
Nodes 2477 1515 923
Links 2947 1489 826
Network Density 4.8e-4 6.5e-4 9.7e-4
We also plot the retweet, mention and reply net-
work separately as shown in figure 3. While retweet,
and mention network show little to no two-way com-
munication, we can observe that the reply network,
while small in size, does in fact have much more inter-
group engagement. We hypothesize that this is likely
a consequence of the “corrective” or “calling-out” be-
havior.
Figure 3: Retweet (left), mention (middle), and re-
ply network (right) with informed users (in green) and
misinformed users (in red) created using ORA-PRO.
[ACR18, Car17]
5.4 Bot Detection
Recent research has found that nearly half of the ac-
counts posting about coronavirus on Twitter are likely
bots [All20]. To understand the role of bots within the
two competing groups, we used Bot-Hunter [BC18] to
identify potential bot-like accounts. We use the prob-
ability of greater than or equal to .75 as our confidence
threshold to identify bots. We use a two-sample z-test
for the difference of proportions (α = 0.05) to test the
difference in proportion of bots between the two com-
peting groups of users. The results of our analyses can
be found in table 4.
Table 4: This table shows the number and percentage
of bots within each of the two competing groups
Measure Overall Informed Misinformed
Number of Users 3629 1697 1043
Number of Bots 505 184 202
Percentage of Bots 14% 11% 19%
We observe that from a total of 3629 users, 14%
(505) of the users are identified as bots. The per-
centage of bots within identified misinformed users,
however, is much higher (19%) than within identified
informed users (11%). We find our results to be sta-
tistically significant (p < 0.001; z = −6.23). This
indicates that more than 1/5th of the misinformation
related posts in our dataset are potentially result of
disinformation campaigns related to COVID-19.
5.5 Sociolinguistic Analysis
To understand the linguistic differences between the
two competing communities, we conduct a linguistic
analysis based on the tweets of the two groups by using
the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) pro-
gram [PBJB15]. LIWC is a text analysis tool which
looks at the different lexical categories each of which
is psychologically meaningful. For a given text, LIWC
calculates the percentage of each LIWC categories. All
of these categories are based on word counts.
We run the LIWC program on the timelines of all
the members for each of the two competing groups.
We only use tweets relevant to COVID-19. We also
remove users identified as bots. Because some users
may be more active than others, using the results of
the program as is may introduce biases in our anal-
yses. To account for those biases, we first normalize
the percentages by the size of the data for each user.
We use the mean of the normalized LIWC indices of
tweets of individual users for a given lexical category
as our test statistic. We use an independent z-test for
the difference in means to establish statistical signifi-
cance. For all our tests, α = 0.05. Our analyses are
summarized in table 5.
Table 5: This table shows the summary of our analyses across all the linguistic dimensions described above using
LIWC. The first column shows the lexical category. The second and third columns show the test statistic (M1)
as the mean of the LIWC indices for informed and misinformed communities respectively. The fourth and fifth
columns display the z-score and p-value for the independent z-test for the difference in means.
Lexical Category M1 (Informed) M1 (Misinformed) z-score (Z1) p-value (Z1)
function 33.90 29.32 7.25 < .001
pronoun 7.97 6.53 4.89 < .001
ipron 3.26 3.03 1.23 .2
ppron 4.71 3.49 5.39 < .001
Analytic 69.83 76.01 -4.82 < .001
social 6.49 5.05 5.45 < .001
family .34 .20 2.24 .03
friend .17 .17 -.03 .97
Authentic 25.12 16.43 6.78 < .001
Tone 35.42 37.59 -1.45 .15
informal 4.89 5.16 -1.63 .10
swear .51 .34 1.86 .06
For this part, we focus on investigating three lin-
guistic dimensions, each of which, along with its lin-
guistic correlates, is described below.
5.5.1 Narrative Discourse Structure
Narratives play a central role in how individuals pro-
cess information, communicate, and reason [Ves17].
We set to test the differences in the usage of narra-
tives or anecdotes between the two COVID-19 mis-
information communities. The LIWC correlates for
narrative discourse structure include high use of func-
tion words, pronouns, analytic summary dimension,
and authenticity. High usage of function words and
pronouns happens more often when expressing feel-
ings and behaviors which tends to happen frequently in
narratives [Pen11]. Moreover, low analytical thinking
also suggests narrative language [PBJB15]. Further-
more, authentic individuals tend to be more personal,
humble, and vulnerable [PBJB15]. Therefore, we use
all of these as proxies to identify variation in the use
of narratives across communities.
In the past [MTMC20], it has also been suggested
that misinformed communities (eg. anti-vaxxers) tend
to use many more pronouns suggesting highly narra-
tive discourse structure. In this analysis, however,
we find that informed users in the COVID-19 dis-
course use significantly more pronouns, more func-
tional words, mention more family-related keywords,
are less analytical, and more authentic and honest in
comparison to misinformed users. All of these suggest
that informed users use many more narratives than
misinformed users. This is an interesting finding as it
presents a dichotomy between the different misinfor-
mation communities (eg. anti-vaxxers and COVID-19
misinformed community). In hindsight, this is also an
intuitive result, as our informed group is obtained from
corrective discourse where users present their stories of
family members or friends suffering from COVID-19 to
call out conspiracies and false information. Because
the two communities still seem to have less two-way
communication, this also suggests that just the con-
tent and framing of the message may not be enough,
and perhaps there is a need to connect the two groups
by identifying an effective medium.
5.5.2 Tone
Tone describes how positive a given text is. According
to the definition by LIWC, the higher the number, the
more positive the tone. Numbers less than 50 typi-
cally suggest a more negative tone. While we do not
see significant differences in the emotional tone of the
competing groups, we find both the communities to be
highly negative.
5.5.3 Linguistic formality
Formality of the language has often been considered
as one of the most important dimensions for stylistic
variation. In [GMC+14], authors define linguistic for-
mality as a style of writing that is meant to be precise,
coherent, articulate and convincing to an educated au-
dience, as opposed to informal discourse which is filled
with deictic references (eg. here, there), pronouns,
and narration. The LIWC correlates to this dimen-
sion are swear words (swear), and informal language
(informal). Informal language in LIWC is computed
on the bases of swear words, netspeak (eg. btw, lol),
nonfluencies (eg. err, hmm), assents (eg. agree, OK),
and fillers (eg. youknow).
From table 5, it can be observed that misinformed
users tend to be more informal than informed users,
though informed users tend to use more swear words
than misinformed users. This is intuitive as many of
our informed users post corrective or sarcastic tweets
to call out misinformation. However, our results are
not significant, and, hence inconclusive.
5.6 Vaccination Stance
To understand the interplay between the different
kinds of misinformation themes and communities, we
identify the vaccination-related stance of the mem-
bers of the misinformed sub-community. To do that,
we first identify the subset of misinformed community
who have posted at least one tweet related to “vac-
cines” in the past. We then collect the user-to-hashtag
co-occurrence network. We use the valence of the vac-
cination hashtags obtained via the method mentioned
in the study in [MTMC20] to identify the stance of
each member (pro vs. anti) based on the weighted
sum of the valences. If the weighted sum is greater
than 0, we identify the member as pro-vaxxer, and if
the weighted sum is less than 0, we identify the mem-
ber as anti-vaxxer. The distribution of the pro- and
anti-vaxxers within the COVID-19 misinformed group
is as shown in table 6.
Table 6: This table shows the number and percentage
of pro- and anti-vaxxers within the misinformed group.
Measure Value
Users w/ vaccine-related tweets 2750 (out of 3629)
Misinformed users 1027 (37%)
Anti-vaxxers 423 (41%)
Pro-vaxxers 224 (22%)
Ambiguous 380 (37%)
Misinformed pro-vaxxer bots 37 (17%)
Misinformed anti-vaxxer bots 82 (22%)
We observe that from 1027 COVID-19 misinformed
users in our dataset, 41% of the members are iden-
tified as anti-vaxxers, whereas only 22% of the mem-
bers are identified as pro-vaxxers. The difference be-
tween the proportions of the two communities is strik-
ing. We also identify the proportion of bots within
each of the two groups: misinformed pro-vaxxers, and
misinformed anti-vaxxers. As shown in table 6, 17%
of the misinformed pro-vaxxers are bots, which is sig-
nificantly lower than the proportion of bots within the
misinformed anti-vaxxers. The first thing this suggests
is that a big chunk of COVID-19 misinformation online
may in fact be disinformation, and hence, intentional.
The existence of bots within both the informed and
misinformed communities also suggests that much of
the disinformation online may be an organized effort
to amplify the COVID-19 debate to create discord in
the communities as seen in the past with Twitter bots
and Russian trolls [BJQ+18].
6 Limitations
The first important limitation pertaining to our work
is that most of our analyses are based on the data that
has been annotated by only 1 annotator. We try to
mitigate this by having more than 1/7th of our anno-
tations annotated by a second annotator, and taking
into account all those annotations while computing the
stance for each user. Another limitation to our work is
that all our analyses are correlational in nature, and do
not depict causation. Finally, one minor limitation re-
lated to our bot analysis is that we use a second-level
inference from a trained model. We try to mitigate
this by using labels with probability greater than or
equal to .75 to ensure high quality labels.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a methodology to charac-
terize the competing COVID-19 misinformation com-
munities by comparing them in terms of their network
structure, sociolinguistic variation, and membership in
disinformation campaigns and in other health-related
misinformation communities such as anti-vaxxers. We
find that even though COVID-19 is a recent event,
misinformation related to it has created a set of polar-
ized communities with high echo-chamberness. Mis-
informed communities are observed to be denser than
informed communities which is in line with previous
studies such as [MTMC20]. We find that bots ex-
ist in both the informed and misinformed groups, but
the percentage of bots in misinformed users is signif-
icantly higher suggesting the prevalence of disinfor-
mation campaigns. Our sociolinguistic analysis sug-
gests that both the target communities depict nega-
tive emotional tone in their posts, with signals that
informed users use many more narratives than mis-
informed users. Finally, we discover that many mis-
informed users may be anti-vaxxers. Our analyses
suggest that misinformation communities are much
more complex as they are highly organized, and tend
to be highly analytical. Unlike previous suggestions
[SOC19], they may not be responsive to narrative cor-
rectives, and hence, a “one size fits all” generic mes-
saging intervention for debunking misinformation may
not be a feasible solution. A successful intervention
may require to identify, and ban the disinformation
campaigns. It may also be useful to identify the right
medium of communication to connect the two groups.
This can be achieved by identifying users in misin-
formed communities who are not rebroadcasting, or
have high betweenness centrality to be messengers for
disseminating factual information. It may also be use-
ful to further understand the linguistic patterns and
preferences of these communities to create an effective
content and framing of the messaging.
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